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POLICY PREFERENCE: AN UNREASONABLE 
MEANS TO ADVANCE MOOT CLAIMS UNDER 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
MOLLY MCGRATH* 
Abstract: Citizen plaintiffs play a vital role in the enforcement of the Endan-
gered Species Act (“ESA”). In Strahan v. Roughead, the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts opened the possibility for expansion of 
a citizen’s ability to impose its own policy preference upon federal agencies 
working to comply with their statutory requirements under the ESA. Although 
the District Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the 
basis of mootness, it erred in its rationale. A plaintiff’s claim under the ESA 
may survive a mootness challenge, even after the violating agency has reiniti-
ated consultation with its overseeing agency, if the potential for relief on al-
ternative grounds remains. Valid alternate bases for relief include award of an 
injunction when a compliance plan does not encompass the full range of an 
agency’s activities, or when an agency fails to demonstrate compliance with 
an existing plan. A citizen’s mere suggestion that an agency’s compliance plan 
adopt alternate protective measures, however, should not extend the life of an 
otherwise moot claim. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, a researcher spotted a North Atlantic right whale in the Norwe-
gian bay of Lopphavet.1 He contacted his colleagues to report this unusual 
appearance.2 In the 1600s, Lopphavet served as a major breeding ground for 
right whales, but none had been spotted in the remote sanctuary in several 
centuries.3 An individual whale’s ability to follow the migratory route of its 
long-deceased ancestors suggests that the right whale possesses either a sig-
nificant institutional memory or evolutionary instinct to seek out new breed-
ing grounds at great distance.4 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 See SCOTT D. KLAUS & ROSALIND M. ROLLAND, The Urban Whale Syndrome, in THE 
URBAN WHALE: NORTH AMERICAN RIGHT WHALES AT A CRISIS 488–90 (Scott D. Klaus & 
Rosalind M. Rolland eds., 2007) (noting that the majority of right whales now live most of their 
lives within 160 kilometers of the densely populated North American Atlantic coast). 
 2 See id. at 488. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at 489; see Jennifer McWeeny, Sounding Depth with the North Atlantic Right Whale and 
Merleau Ponty: An Exercise in Comparative Phenomenology, J. FOR CRITICAL ANIMAL STUD., 
Jan. 2011, at 144, 155 (discussing maternal teaching, memory, and instinct as possible explana-
tions for right whales’ ability to scout prey aggregations from thousands of kilometers away). 
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Due to their slow speed and tendency to travel long distances right 
whales remain vulnerable to ship strikes.5 Right whales first received pro-
tection from intentional hunting under the multilateral 1931 Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling.6 In the United States, Congress designated right 
whales as an endangered species through the Endangered Species Act of 
1973 (“ESA”).7 With this federal protection, the right whale population in-
creased from 295 in 1992 to nearly five hundred in 2010.8 Yet, right whales 
remain vulnerable—a 2016 study reported a nearly forty percent decline in 
birth rate since 2010.9 As a result, environmentalists have rallied around 
these fascinating creatures in an effort to prevent impending extinction.10 In 
New England, conservation biologist Max Strahan serves as one of the right 
whales’ fiercest advocates.11 
Litigation is Strahan’s primary weapon in his crusade against right 
whale extinction.12 He often invokes the ESA’s citizen suit provision to ini-
tiate lawsuits against government entities whose actions contribute to spe-
cies decline and habitat destruction.13 The ESA’s citizen suit provision is a 
means for concerned actors to ensure that a government agency complies 
with procedural requirements when the agency acts in a way that risks harm 
                                                                                                                           
 5 NOAA Files Environmental Impact Statement on Ship Strike Reduction Measures, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2008/
20080825_shipstrike.html [https://perma.cc/AQ7D-Q2VL] (recognizing that right whales’ slow 
speed and migratory patterns through shipping lanes along the United States’ eastern coast serve 
as major contributory factors to declining population). 
 6 Convention for Regulation of Whaling art. 4, Mar. 31, 1932, 49 Stat. 3079, L.N.T.S. 8080 
(referring to right whales as “North Cape whales”); A History of the International Whaling Commis-
sion, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered_species/cetaceans/
cetaceans/iwc/history/ [https://perma.cc/EJ3A-X3DQ]. 
 7 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2016). 
 8 Endangered Right Whale Population Threatened by Entanglements and Dramatically De-
clining Birth Rate, SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/
09/160901092829.html [https://perma.cc/HAY6-5WAB]. 
 9 THOMAS A. JEFFERSON ET AL., MARINE MAMMALS OF THE WORLD: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO THEIR IDENTIFICATION 33 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing contributing factors to right whale 
population decline, including scars from ship strikes, vessel collisions, habitat destruction, pollu-
tion, and disturbance resulting from vessel traffic); Endangered Right Whale Population Threat-
ened by Entanglements and Dramatically Declining Birth Rate, supra note 8. 
 10 See Megan Tady, Environmentalists Urge Greater Right Whale Protections, NEW STAND-
ARD (June 6, 2006), http://newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/3255 [https://perma.cc/
X7LZ-QN24]. 
 11 See Carey Goldberg, A Boston Firebrand Alienates His Allies Even as He Saves Whales, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/23/us/a-boston-firebrand-alienates-
his-allies-even-as-he-saves-whales.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/V9S8-VNBX]. 
 12 See id. 
 13 Id.; see Strahan v. New Eng. Aquarium, 25 F. App’x 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2002); Strahan v. Lin-
non, 967 F. Supp. 581, 592 (D. Mass. 1997). 
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to an endangered species.14 Recognizing that all agency action occurring in 
proximity to an endangered species’ habitat carries a risk of harm, agencies 
are permitted a specified level of authorized taking, based on careful con-
sultation with an overseeing agency.15 
As a check on agency power, private citizens may challenge the ade-
quacy of a subsidiary agency’s consultation process, even after a subsidiary 
agency begins consultation with its overseeing agency.16 In Strahan v. 
Roughead, Strahan invoked the citizen suit provision to seek an injunction 
against the United States Navy (“the Navy”) for its alleged violation of its 
duties to engage in formal consultation and to develop and implement said 
compliance plan.17 Because of these violations, Strahan argued that the Navy 
could not adequately ensure the continued existence of the right whale spe-
cies or protection of the species’ habitat.18 In addition, Strahan sought a per-
manent injunction to prevent Navy ship operations within one thousand yards 
of federally protected whales.19 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts found that the Navy failed to demonstrate the adequacy 
of its compliance process, preserving Strahan’s potential for meaningful relief 
on the merits of the case.20 Therefore, the District Court rejected the Navy’s 
motion to dismiss on the basis of mootness.21 
Although Strahan’s procedural success serves as a reminder of the im-
portant role citizen plaintiffs play in ensuring that government agencies ad-
here to truly comprehensive compliance plans, Strahan establishes a ques-
tionable precedent.22 This Comment argues that, where other circuit courts 
recognize meaningful relief beyond re-initiation of consultation, the District 
                                                                                                                           
 14 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012); see Jonathan Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing 
and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 41–42 (2001). 
 15 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2) (classifying takings made in compliance with written statements—
prepared by an overseeing agency after consultation—as not prohibited); see also id. § 1532(19) 
(defining “take” as an act or attempt to engage in an act meant “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” an endangered species). 
 16 See id. § 1532. Such challenges may result in the re-initiation of consultation between the 
subsidiary agency and the overseeing agency. See id. Before proceeding with an action expected 
to impact an endangered species or its critical habitat, the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) re-
quires all federal agencies to engage in consultation with their overseeing agency to assess the 
potential impact of the action and to develop reasonable alternatives to minimize impact of the 
action upon the listed endangered species. Id. In the context of the ESA, overseeing agencies are 
specifically tasked guiding the action of other federal entities in stewardship of biological life. See 
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., STEWARDSHIP OF 
LIVING MARINE RESOURCES 1 (2016), http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/policybriefs/NMFS-FY17.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2F6P-8HR8].  
 17 See 910 F. Supp. 2d 358, 367 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. at 381. 
 21 See id. at 382. 
 22 See id.; Adler, supra note 14, at 42. 
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Court’s decision in Strahan suggests that citizens’ policy suggestions may 
extend the life of an otherwise moot claim.23 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On May 30, 2008, plaintiff Max Strahan filed a complaint pro se 
against the Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts.24 Strahan alleged that naval operations along the Atlantic Coast, 
including ship strikes, equipment noise, and bomb discharges, routinely 
caused harm to whales protected by the ESA.25 In three separate complaints, 
Strahan argued that the Navy violated §§ 7 and 9 of the ESA through unlaw-
ful takings of federally protected whales and by refusing to re-enter into for-
mal consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) to 
address the impact of its operations.26 The Navy filed a motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on mootness, arguing that it complet-
ed formal consultation with the NMFS to address the impact of its proposed 
actions.27 The consultation produced an incidental take statement, which the 
Navy contended shielded the agency from liability for alleged violations of 
the ESA’s consultation requirement.28 The Navy argued, therefore, that Stra-
han lacked any potential for meaningful relief, rendering his claim moot.29 
After a brief discovery process, the Navy filed a renewed motion to dismiss, 
and Strahan opposed the motion.30 
To support its motion to dismiss, the Navy filed thirteen exhibits, com-
prised of biological opinions and incidental take statements produced in 
conjunction with the NMFS.31 In analyzing these exhibits, the District Court 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 462 (9th Cir. 2006); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. 
Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1241–45 (9th Cir. 1988); Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 380–81; Or. Nat’l 
Desert Ass’n v. Tidwell, 716 F. Supp. 2d 982, 994–95 (D. Or. 2010); infra notes 66–88 and ac-
companying text. 
 24 See Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 362, 367. 
 25 Id. at 367. 
 26 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2012); Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 367. 
 27 16 U.S.C. § 1538; Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 363; 50 C.F.R § 402.14(h)–(i) (2016). 
 28 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538; Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 363, 367; 50 C.F.R § 402.14(i) (defining 
“incidental take statement” as a binding opinion issued by an overseeing agency, specifying the 
allowable amount of incidental taking of a species and defining prudent measures to reduce impact 
upon species). 
 29 See Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 363. 
 30 Id. at 367. 
 31 Id. at 369. A biological opinion is an assessment conducted by the overseeing agency, ex-
amining the effects of the subsidiary agency’s actions upon endangered species and their critical 
habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h). An incidental take statement is a compliance plan developed by the 
overseeing agency, outlining precautions the subsidiary must undergo to protect endangered spe-
cies, and identifying a maximum number of the listed endangered species that may be legally 
harmed or taken as the result of the subsidiary agency’s activities without violating the ESA. Id. 
§ 402.14(i). 
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concluded that it was unclear whether the biological opinions and incidental 
take statements addressed the full scope of the Navy’s activities along the 
coast.32 In addition, the District Court concluded that the Navy failed to 
provide evidence to demonstrate compliance with existing incidental take 
statements.33 
The District Court denied the Navy’s renewed motion to dismiss and in-
structed the parties to complete discovery on the issue of mootness.34 Subse-
quently, the District Court dismissed the case on August 23, 2013, in part be-
cause Strahan failed to comply with a separate court order.35 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A claim is moot if the court is unable to provide any meaningful relief 
to the plaintiff.36 In asserting a mootness claim, the moving party bears a 
heavy burden in demonstrating lack of meaningful relief.37 If an event that 
extinguishes the possibility of the court providing meaningful relief to satis-
fy the plaintiff’s claims occurs after the filing of the complaint, the court 
must dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of 
mootness.38 
Further, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), a de-
fendant may seek a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
on the basis of mootness.39 In considering such motions, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that if facts underlying the 
jurisdictional question closely intertwine with the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim, the defendant must demonstrate that these facts are no longer in dis-
pute.40 
In Torres-Negron v. J & N Records, the First Circuit recognized that, if 
the facts that the court must analyze to resolve a jurisdictional question are 
the same facts it must analyze in deciding the merits of a plaintiff’s cause of 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 376–77. 
 33 Id. at 376. 
 34 Id. at 382. 
 35 See Strahan v. Roughead, No. 08-CV-10919-MLW, 2014 WL 2594082, at *1 (D. Mass. 
June 9, 2014) (upholding Navy’s motion to dismiss due to Strahan’s failure to submit discovery 
report as required by 2013 court order). 
 36 See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996); Gulf of Me. Fishermen’s All. v. Daley, 
292 F.3d 84, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 37 See Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). 
 38 See Church of Sci. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992); Gulf of Me. Fishermen’s All., 
292 F.3d at 88 (holding that the promulgation of new regulations following the initiation of an 
action to enjoin enforcement of previously promulgated regulations mooted the plaintiff’s claims). 
 39 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362–63 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
 40 See Torres-Negron v. J & N Records, 504 F.3d 151, 163 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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action, the plaintiff’s case may not be dismissed if those facts remain in dis-
pute.41 In contrast, where the facts that are determinative of the jurisdiction-
al question are not intertwined with the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, a 
court in the First Circuit may engage in fact-finding to decide whether it 
may hear the case.42 Further, the First Circuit has held that factual allega-
tions made by plaintiffs in a motion to dismiss under § 12(b)(1) of the 
FRCP should be credited as true in the absence of countervailing evidence 
presented by the defendant.43 
In his suit against the Navy, pro se plaintiff Max Strahan sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief under §§ 7 and 9 of the Endangered Species 
Act (“ESA”).44 The ESA is a federal statute that allows the Secretary of the 
Interior to promulgate regulations protecting endangered or threatened spe-
cies and to designate their natural habitat.45 To prevent proposed agency 
actions from injuring or endangering species or damaging their habitats, the 
ESA requires federal agencies to engage in a formal consultation process 
with their overseeing agency.46 The purpose of this formal consultation is to 
determine whether the proposed action might harm an endangered species, 
and whether the subsidiary agency can avoid or minimize the harm of its 
proposed actions.47 The consultation process requires the overseeing agency 
to complete a biological opinion—cataloguing the potential impact of an 
agency action upon a species—and to create an incidental take statement—
listing a specified amount of allowed harm and outlining protective 
measures.48 
Section 9 of the ESA prevents agencies from unlawful takings of en-
dangered species.49 When contemplating an action likely to result in the 
incidental taking of an endangered species, a subsidiary agency may shield 
itself from liability under § 9 by initiating consultation with its overseeing 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2010); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigra-
tion & Customs Enf’t Div. of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 44 Strahan v. Roughead, 910 F. Supp. 2d 358, 368 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 45 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012). Damage of a listed species’ natural habitat may constitute an 
unlawful taking because degradation can injure wildlife by disrupting behavioral patterns neces-
sary to survival. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d 1101, 
1106 (9th Cir. 2012). In developing a compliance plan, an overseeing agency examines the poten-
tial impact of agency action upon the natural habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016). 
 46 16 U.S.C. § 1536; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)–(h). 
 47 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)–(i). 
 48 Id. 
 49 16 U.S.C. § 1538. The ESA defines “take” as an act or attempt to engage in an act meant 
“to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect” an endangered species. 
Id. § 1532(19). 
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agency, pursuant to § 7 of the ESA.50 In the event that initial informal con-
sultation with the overseeing agency fails to fully address the possible harm 
resulting from a proposed action, the subsidiary agency must engage in a 
formal consultation process, in which the overseeing agency produces a 
biological opinion addressing the likelihood of harm and possible alterna-
tive policies that would comply with the ESA.51 If the overseeing agency 
decides that the subsidiary agency’s proposed action complies with the 
ESA, the overseeing agency issues an incidental take statement, specifying 
the amount of authorized taking, thus shielding the subordinate agency from 
liability.52 
Prior to the First Circuit’s decision in Strahan v. Roughead, other cir-
cuit courts established that a concerned citizen or organization’s action al-
leging § 9 liability could survive a mootness challenge on several grounds.53 
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
held that agency action taken after development of a compliance plan still 
might constitute an unlawful taking of an endangered species, offering two 
primary justifications.54 First, agency action might constitute an unlawful 
taking where the offending agency fails to show its existing plan addresses 
the full extent of its activities.55 Second, agency action may constitute an 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. § 1536(b)(4); Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 
1239 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 51 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012); Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1239. 
 52 Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1239; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b)(1). 
 53 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1108; Or. Nat’l Res. Council v. Allen, 476 
F.3d 1031, 1034–35, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007); Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1239; In re 
Operation of Mo. River Sys. Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1160 (D. Minn. 2004). If an agency 
operates outside the bounds of the safe harbor established in its incidental take statement, it does 
so “at its own peril . . . for any person who knowingly takes an endangered or threatened species is 
subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties, including imprisonment.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 
U.S. 154, 170 (1997). A citizen plaintiff may challenge the validity of an agency’s creation of an 
incidental take statement or a biological opinion as arbitrary and capricious under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th. Cir. 
2012). 
 54 See Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 462–63 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting mootness 
challenge where potential for declaratory relief remained due to agency’s unwillingness to  com-
ply with existing compliance plan); Or. Nat. Res. Council, 476 F.3d at 1036–37 (rejecting validity 
of an incidental take statement that failed to quantify allowed takings of northern spotted owls); 
Or. Wild v. Connor, No. 6:09–CV–00185–AA, 2012 WL 3756327, at *2–*3 (D. Or. Aug. 27, 
2012) (noting that the subsidiary agency complied with and would be able to comply with an ex-
isting incidental taking statement); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Tidwell, 716 F. Supp. 2d 982, 994–
995 (D. Or. 2010) (holding that the subsidiary agency could not demonstrate compliance with its 
incidental taking statement). 
 55 Or. Nat. Res. Council, 476 F.3d at 1036–37 (rejecting validity of existing incidental take 
statement as arbitrary and capricious for failure to encompass full range of activities through its 
failure to quantify allowed takings). 
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unlawful taking where an agency fails to provide evidence of compliance 
with an existing plan.56 
Even after re-initiation of consultation, additional forms of meaningful 
relief may defeat a mootness challenge.57 In Oregon Natural Desert Associ-
ation v. Tidwell, the defendant subsidiary agency began re-initiation of con-
sultation after the plaintiff filed his claim.58 The agency argued that, be-
cause re-initiation was the only means of the relief that a court could pro-
vide to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s claim was moot.59 Noting the defendant 
agency’s failure to comply with previous grazing authorizations and consul-
tation plans, the court identified a potential injunction against the defendant 
agency as a meaningful form of relief still available to the plaintiff, enabling 
the suit to survive a mootness challenge.60 In Strahan v. Linnon, the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts mooted the plaintiff’s 
claim because no meaningful relief remained, finding that the challenged 
consultation plan fully considered the agency’s activities and that the agen-
cy had not violated this existing plan.61 
In determining whether a plaintiff’s opportunity for meaningful relief 
exists when inter-agency consultation is ongoing, the Ninth Circuit has held 
that an entity’s failure to follow existing plans opens the possibility for 
court-provided relief beyond re-initiation of consultation.62 For example, in 
Oregon Natural Desert Association, the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon held that the challenged agency’s repeated violations of 
existing grazing plans made the likelihood that a court could offer meaning-
ful relief so great that the plaintiff’s claim could not be properly mooted, as 
previous damage could carry over into subsequent seasons.63 In Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center v. Gordon, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
plaintiff still had the opportunity for meaningful relief in the form of a de-
claratory judgment against the federal agency, even though the federal 
agency removed the opportunity for injunctive relief by reinitiating the con-
sultation process.64 In Forest Guardians v. Johanns, where the defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Id.; Or. Nat. Res. Council 476 F.3d at 1034–35; see Or. Wild, 2012 WL 3756327, at *2–*3 
(noting that the subsidiary agency complied with and would be able to comply with an existing 
incidental taking statement); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 994–995 (holding that the 
subsidiary agency could not demonstrate compliance with its incidental taking statement). 
 57 Forest Guardians, 450 F.3d at 462–63. 
 58 See 716 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 59 See id. at 995. 
 60 See id. The potential injunction would have ensured the defendant agency’s compliance 
with a new consultation plan. See id. 
 61 957 F. Supp. 581, 597, 599 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 62 See Forest Guardians, 450 F.3d at 462–63; Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 63 See 716 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 64 See 849 F.2d 1241, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 1988). In this case, the federal agency failed to com-
ply with its own fishery management plan. Id. 
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agency expressed an unwillingness to comply with the terms of the newly 
created compliance plan, the Ninth Circuit recognized the continued oppor-
tunity for meaningful relief through a declaratory judgment and refused to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s claims on the basis of mootness.65 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Strahan v. Roughead, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts declined to grant the United States Navy’s motion to 
dismiss Strahan’s claims on the basis of the mootness.66 The court ultimate-
ly held that a defendant agency’s inability to demonstrate the adequacy of 
its consultation process will allow a plaintiff’s claim under § 7 of the En-
dangered Species Act (“ESA”) to survive a mootness challenge, as the po-
tential for meaningful relief remains.67  
The court concluded that the Navy failed to demonstrate the adequacy 
of its ongoing consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Services in 
three ways.68 First, the court found the Navy’s ongoing consultation did not 
fully address its activities along the Atlantic coast.69 Because the Navy 
failed to present evidence to counter that point, the potential inadequacy 
preserved the plaintiff’s potential for meaningful relief.70 Second, the Navy 
failed to provide evidence to demonstrate its adherence with its existing 
compliance plan.71 Strahan could have received meaningful relief had the 
Navy completed its obligation to provide affirmative evidence of compli-
ance.72 Third, the court held that the failure of the Navy’s compliance plan 
to address an alternative policy proposed by Strahan left room for the possi-
bility of meaningful relief, thereby defeating the mootness challenge.73 
The District Court’s third conclusion is especially problematic because 
it allows plaintiffs to defeat a mootness challenge by proposing an alterna-
tive policy previously unconsidered in interagency consultation.74 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the District Court noted that the subsidiary agency need-
ed to re-initiate its consultation to provide appropriate relief to Strahan in 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See 450 F.3d at 462–63. Here, the defendant agency willingly underwent consultation with 
is overseeing agency, but the defendant agency refused to comply with the existing plans because 
it viewed them as “unreasonable.” Id. 
 66 910 F. Supp. 2d 358, 382 (D. Mass. 2012). 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. at 380. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. Meaningful relief may include the re-initiation of consultation, in which the agency 
addresses the potential harms outlined in the plaintiff’s complaint. See id. at 376, 380. 
 71 Id. at 376–77. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 380–81. 
 74 See id. 
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the form of responses to Strahan’s factual allegations about unreported and 
unaddressed injuries towards right whales.75 The District Court then con-
cluded that the plaintiff’s alternative policy suggestion also preserves poten-
tial for meaningful relief.76 While the District Court rightfully acknowl-
edged that re-initiation might be appropriate to cure unaddressed harms, the 
court’s preservation of a claim based upon agency failure to include a 
broader alternative policy impedes upon agency discretion.77 
To support its conclusion that Strahan’s proposal of an unaddressed poli-
cy alternative creates the potential for meaningful relief, the District Court 
cited Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Tidwell and Forest Guardians v. 
Johanns.78 In Oregon Natural Desert Association and Forest Guardians, the 
potential for meaningful relief through an injunctive action was present be-
cause the defendant agencies previously violated existing plans or explicitly 
expressed their refusal to comply.79 There, the proposed alternative basis for 
meaningful relief was an injunctive action to ensure agency adherence to the 
compliance plans.80 In Strahan, the Navy had not repeatedly violated an ap-
proved compliance plan, and the consideration of the plaintiff’s alternative 
policy was unrelated to any purported Navy violation.81 
The District Court’s conclusion allows future plaintiffs to defeat moot-
ness challenges by adding policy alternatives to their claims.82 Although the 
Navy may have violated its existing compliance plan, the appropriate form 
of relief would not be inclusion of an alternative policy—rather, an injunc-
tion to ensure that the Navy adhere to a new compliance plan, developed 
through the re-initiation process, would be more appropriate.83 Plaintiffs 
may commence action against agencies for failure to adhere to procedural 
obligations in developing a compliance plan.84 Under the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”), plaintiffs may challenge the means by which an 
agency came to a decision.85 In bringing a mootness challenge based upon 
alternative policy preference, the plaintiff nor the court made reference to 
the APA.86 Plaintiffs may a challenge an agency action that occurs outside 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. at 380. 
 78 Id.; see 450 F.3d 455, 461–63 (9th Cir. 2006); 716 F. Supp. 2d 982, 994 (D. Or. 2010). 
 79 See Forest Guardians, 450 F.3d at 461–63; Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 80 See Forest Guardians, 450 F.3d at 461–63; Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 81 See Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d. at 376, 380–81. 
 82 See id. 
 83 See Forest Guardians, 450 F.3d at 461–63; Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
 84 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012). 
 85 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706 (2012); see Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 
1017 (9th. Cir. 2012). An agency action is deemed unlawful where it is found to be arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 86 See Strahan, 910 F. Supp 2d. at 362. 
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the established limits of an existing compliance plan.87 To permit a citizen 
to defeat a mootness challenge through an alternative policy proposal im-
pedes the discretion of an overseeing agency to develop a compliance plan 
and set the limits of an appropriate taking.88 
CONCLUSION 
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts cor-
rectly denied the Navy’s motion to dismiss on the basis of mootness, find-
ing that the Navy failed to both develop a comprehensive plan and demon-
strate compliance with this existing plan. Due to the Navy’s failure to com-
ply with and to create a comprehensive plan, the District Court recognized 
the plaintiff’s potential for meaningful relief and declined to dismiss the 
claims. While the Ninth Circuit has allowed an alternative form of relief to 
extend an otherwise moot claim, the District Court deviated from the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach by allowing a citizen proposal to serve as a valid means 
to survive a mootness challenge. The purpose of the ESA citizen suit provi-
sion is to challenge the adequacy of the agency consultation process, but 
specific citizen policy preferences are more appropriately articulated in the 
course of the agency rulemaking process. 
                                                                                                                           
 87 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1538; see Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 380–81. 
 88 See Strahan, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 380–81. 
